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I. INTRODUCTION
Cybersecurity is no longer the sole province of computer scientists,
information technology (IT) departments, and hackers. A working un-
derstanding of digital technology and its attendant risks is now a pre-
requisite for the effective management of any complex organization in
the twenty-first century. Executives in government and business must
strengthen their own internal cybersecurity programs and prepare for
the fallout when preventive measures inevitably fail. They must also
plan to respond to attacks on external, unrelated entities that can
have cascading effects throughout the economy and society. Although
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the United States has yet to suffer from a widespread, persistent
cyber attack on critical systems, discrete incidents illustrate that
criminals and foreign adversaries have the capability to cause massive
economic and physical damage. A single “cyber apocalypse” is un-
likely, but even the most mundane instances of cyber crime, in aggre-
gate, inflict a tremendous toll on the national economy.1
Traditionally, the federal government has taken the lead in de-
fending the nation against man-made national security threats. Con-
stitutional law and practice generally left it to states and their
political subdivisions to safeguard the public welfare from more mun-
dane dangers such as crime and weather-related hazards. The Sep-
tember 11 attacks and the subsequent struggle against decentralized
terrorist networks solidified a newly assertive role for state and local
government in national-security matters.
Similarly, the distributed structure of networked communications,
combined with the sheer size of the United States and the decentral-
ized federalist system on which it is founded, means that the federal
government cannot secure the nation’s computer-based infrastructure
alone. Whatever the origin of a given cyber attack—whether it is a
disruptive attack against infrastructure or a more common email
scam—its effects are inherently local, as is the response. Huge swaths
of the nation’s critical infrastructure are controlled or regulated by
state and local entities. Citizens’ and businesses’ interactions with
state and local officials far outstrips their engagement with federal
entities. As a result, assessing the impact of cybersecurity policy re-
quires a bottom-up flow of information from citizens and businesses to
the federal government. Standards and recommendations to improve
one’s risk exposure often flow from national or federal organizations
back down to the local level. States lie at the nexus of these informa-
tion flows.
States might have difficulty contributing to cybersecurity policy if
they cannot secure their own information assets. The information-se-
curity community long ago identified the best practices that can mean-
ingfully reduce risk to the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
state-owned and -controlled data and related systems. Modern
software and hardware offerings reduce the burden of integrating
those best practices with IT management and adapting them to new
threats. As a result, the core challenge for state cybersecurity profes-
sionals today is not technical; the cutting edge of cybersecurity is gov-
ernance. From basic firewalls to the most sophisticated malware
analysis, all technology solutions must be configured and imple-
1. Steve Morgan, Cybercrime Damages Expected to Cost the World $6 Trillion by
2021, CSO ONLINE (Aug. 22, 2016), http://www.csoonline.com/article/3110467/se
curity/cybercrime-damages-expected-to-cost-the-world-6-trillion-by-2021.html
[https://perma.unl.edu/X4SC-DBQD].
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mented by humans. In academic literature and corporate guidelines,
cybersecurity governance is commonly described as the process
through which humans understand organizational risk, prioritize re-
sources, and establish procedures to erect technical defenses against
computer-based attacks.
We argue that state cybersecurity governance deserves a broader
definition that reflects the expansive role for states in the broader
cybersecurity ecosystem, one that obligates state officials to do more
than defend state networks. States have a fundamental responsibility
to protect constituents, including interstate businesses, from day-to-
day cyber attacks and to prepare public and private institutions for a
widespread cyber disruption. States also have an abiding interest in
growing the cybersecurity workforce through innovative education
and training initiatives. A deeper talent pool is a precondition for opti-
mum risk management in the public and private sectors, as well as a
driver of employment and economic growth more broadly. Across the
nation, state chief information officers (CIOs), chief information-se-
curity officers (CISOs), homeland security advisors, and other officials
or advisors are attempting to implement wide-ranging cybersecurity
initiatives to achieve these purposes. However, such officials are gen-
erally equipped with small budgets and limited authority.
Success demands a whole-of-state approach that assembles stake-
holders, assigns responsibilities, sets timelines, allocates resources,
and establishes accountability mechanisms. Officials must involve
municipalities, educational institutions, and small businesses in addi-
tion to state IT agencies and critical infrastructure operators. Good
governance functions to overcome resource constraints and bureau-
cratic resistance, thereby empowering officials to manage technical
controls and user behavior across the state enterprise, boost informa-
tion sharing among public and private partners, share best practices,
plan for cyber incidents and cyber disruptions, align educational stan-
dards with business needs, and prepare for future threats that have
yet to materialize. This is state cybersecurity governance. It extends
beyond the network’s edge.
II. GOVERNANCE: THE NEW FRONTIER OF
INFORMATION ASSURANCE
A resilient information-security posture requires three core compe-
tencies: (1) the deployment of technical and administrative controls to
harden vulnerable information assets; (2) user awareness programs
and training to maximize compliance with established controls; and
(3) the collection and dissemination of information needed to adapt the
current security posture to emerging threats. In implementing these
key elements of cybersecurity, today’s businesses and government
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agencies are most commonly frustrated not by technical questions but
rather by organizational ones.
Widely available technical solutions can reduce cybersecurity risk
to tolerable levels. Modern developments in cryptography, software
applications, and hardware have simplified the process of implement-
ing time-tested techniques to mitigate most, if not all, known security
vulnerabilities. A wide array of native and third-party solutions
smooth the process of conducting risk assessments, segmenting net-
works, whitelisting applications, disabling active content in emails,
and detecting intruders, among other measures.2 Basic defenses such
as these would block many of the most common forms of cyber attack,
as well as some of the most devastating ones.3 Even when sophisti-
cated attacks circumvent these safeguards, raising the cost of intru-
sions via technical best practices filters out standard criminals,
freeing up defenders to focus on the most advanced threats. Although
states have access to the proper technology to implement effective
technical countermeasures, dispersing that technology throughout a
state’s bureaucracy is fundamentally an organizational problem.
Security technology cannot be effective if misconfigured, misap-
plied, or ignored by its users. Human error is a common cause of se-
curity breaches in the private and public sectors.4 Many of the most
2. See, e.g., INFO. ASSURANCE DIRECTORATE, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, IAD’S TOP 10 INFOR-
MATION ASSURANCE MITIGATION STRATEGIES (2013), https://www.sans.org/security
-resources/IAD_top_10_info_assurance_mitigations.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
YD55-QJVS].
3. See, e.g., TERI RADICHEL, CASE STUDY: CRITICAL CONTROLS THAT COULD HAVE PRE-
VENTED TARGET BREACH (2014), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/
casestudies/case-study-critical-controls-prevented-target-breach-35412 [https://
perma.unl.edu/Z2TH-87AW]; WATERISAC, 10 BASIC CYBERSECURITY MEASURES ii
(2015) (“In reviewing its incident reports for 2014, ICS-CERT noted that imple-
mentation of the first three recommendations likely would have detected the is-
sues, prevented the vulnerabilities, and averted the resulting impacts related to
those incidents.”); see also Anthony Kimery, Feds Wasting Available Cyber-
security Resources, Survey Finds, HOMELAND SECURITY TODAY (Dec. 7, 2016),
http://www.hstoday.us/briefings/daily-news-analysis/single-article/feds-wasting-
available-cybersecurity-resources-survey-finds/9bbea943f86012babb3b32cba89a
520a.html [https://perma.unl.edu/2LDZ-EA6X] (“The federal government is
under-utilizing available resources and manpower they already possess . . . .”);
Steve Ragan, Phishing Remains Top Attack Vector for Criminals, Both Novice
and Professional, CSO ONLINE (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.csoonline.com/article/
3036837/security/phishing-remains-top-attack-vector-for-criminals-both-novice-
and-professional.html [https://perma.unl.edu/MXB2-DRH4] (identifying humans
within an organization as a “soft target”).
4. See, e.g., Brian M. Bowen, Ramaswamy Devarajan & Salvatore Stolfo, Measuring
the Human Factor of Cyber Security, HOMELAND SECURITY AFF. (May 2012),
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=710052 [https://perma.unl.edu/9E8N-PWRV]
(“Computer security is not just about technology and systems. It is also about the
people that use those systems and how their vulnerable behaviors can lead to
exploitation.”); James A. (Sandy) Winnefeld Jr., Christopher Kirchhoff & David
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sophisticated malware variants—including those used by nation-
states—depend on a lapse in human judgment to compromise target
systems.5 In the information-security community, a truism has taken
hold: information assurance depends on maximizing user compliance
with security policies.6 State CISOs want to prioritize training and
awareness programs for state employees,7 but inculcating a culture of
risk requires organizational change beyond mandatory training
videos.8
Properly designed information-security programs cannot stop all
attacks, particularly those that exploit unknown security vulnerabili-
ties. Evolving threats have generated a broad desire for more informa-
tion sharing among entities who might otherwise resist working
together. In recent years, Information Sharing and Analysis Centers/
Organizations (ISACs/ISAOs) have emerged across the private sector
from finance and energy to healthcare and transportation. Federal of-
ficials have devoted significant time, funding, and political capital to
establish nationwide information-sharing organizations, including the
National Cybersecurity Communications Integration Center (NCCIC)
and the Multi-State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-
ISAC). States, too, have begun creating their own information-sharing
bodies, building on the law enforcement fusion centers that emerged
M. Upton, Cybersecurity’s Human Factor: Lessons from the Pentagon, HARV. BUS.
REV. (Sept. 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/09/cybersecuritys-human-factor-lessons-
from-the-pentagon [https://perma.unl.edu/8VCU-ZU2H] (“Mistakes by network
administrators and users—failures to patch vulnerabilities in legacy systems,
misconfigured settings, violations of standard procedures—open the door to the
overwhelming majority of successful attacks.”).
5. See, e.g., Kevin Albano & Limon Kessem, The Full Shamoon: How the Devastat-
ing Malware Was Inserted into Networks, SECURITYINTELLIGENCE (Feb. 15, 2017),
https://securityintelligence.com/the-full-shamoon-how-the-devastating-malware-
was-inserted-into-networks [https://perma.unl.edu/4DE4-W6FB].
6. See, e.g., Aisha Chowdhry, Officials Talk Candidly About Workforce Cyber Hy-
giene, FCW (Apr. 25, 2016), https://fcw.com/articles/2016/04/25/chowdhry-cyber-
hygiene.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/3FBV-BX84]; Dan Lohrmann, Ten Recom-
mendations for Security Awareness Programs, GOV’T TECH. (Mar. 9, 2014), http://
www.govtech.com/blogs/lohrmann-on-cybersecurity/Ten-Recommendations-for-
Security-Awareness-Programs.html [https://perma.unl.edu/JM7L-7E8S].
7. DELOITTE & NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE CHIEF INFO. OFFICERS, 2016 DELOITTE–NAS-
CIO CYBERSECURITY STUDY 6 (2016) [hereinafter DELOITTE–NASCIO STUDY],
http://www.nascio.org/Portals/0/Publications/Documents/2016/2016-Deloitte-
NASCIO-Cybersecurity-Study.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/6CY8-2ZBB].
8. See Stefanie Jahner & Helmut Krcmar, Beyond Technical Aspects of Information
Security: Risk Culture as a Success Factor for IT Risk Management, in AMCIS
2005 PROCEEDINGS 3327, 3330 (2005), http://aisel.aisnet.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1974&context=amcis2005 (“While traditional IT risk management fo-
cuses on securing processes and IT infrastructure IT risk culture additionally
takes the senior management, the organizational structure, artifacts and organi-
zational members into consideration and thus underpins the multi-level charac-
ter of an integrated IT risk management.”).
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in response to counterterrorism needs during the 2000s.9 Adapting
longstanding information-sharing practices to the realm of cyber-
security is yet another organizational challenge as a wider range of
relevant stakeholders—extending beyond the law enforcement and
national-security offices common in existing fusion centers—may be
reluctant to participate.10
In short, the frontier of cybersecurity today is ensuring that time-
tested, risk-based techniques for hardening systems, training users,
and sharing information are implemented, sustained, and coordi-
nated.11 Organizations accomplish these objectives through govern-
ance,12 the “formal and informal institutions that [influence how] a
group of people determine what to decide, how to decide, and who
shall decide.”13 A large body of research has explored the importance
of governance in managing information technology across large orga-
nizations.14 States have created entire agencies, guided by compre-
hensive IT strategies, to align technology demands with “business
9. See, e.g., Press Release, N.J. Cybersecurity & Commc’ns Integration Cell, NJC-
CIC and NH-ISAC Partner to Enhance Cybersecurity Information Sharing at the
State Level (Jan. 26, 2016), https://www.cyber.nj.gov/press-releases/njccic-and-
nh-isac-partner-to-enhance-cybersecurity-information-sharing-at-the-state-level
[https://perma.unl.edu/6JBZ-3X4D]; California Cybersecurity Integration Center,
CAL. GOVERNOR’S OFF. EMERGENCY SERVS., http://www.caloes.ca.gov/cal-oes-divi-
sions/law-enforcement/california-cybersecurity-integration-center [https://perma
.unl.edu/S2LN-2UTN].
10. According to Michael Echols, CEO of the International Association of Certified
ISAOs (IACI), “[B]ecause many of the issues are not technical, we want to create
opportunities to overcome challenges to cybersecurity. For instance, in many
cases there are issues related to taxonomy. Too many times some term means
different things to different people, creating communication barriers.” George V.
Hulme, Tackling Cybersecurity Threat Information Sharing Challenges, CSO
(Jan. 18, 2017), http://www.cso.com.au/article/612824/tackling-cybersecurity-
threat-information-sharing-challenges.
11. Merrill Warkentin & Allen C. Johnston, IT Security Governance and Centralized
Security Controls, in ENTERPRISE INFORMATION SYSTEMS ASSURANCE AND SYSTEMS
SECURITY 16 (2006), https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Merrill_Warkentin/pub
lication/292549265_IT_Security_Governance_and_Centralized_Security_Con
trols/links/56bcd43a08aed6959945bda0/IT-Security-Governance-and-Central-
ized-Security-Controls.pdf (explaining that information security goals “can only
be achieved if the policies and procedures are complete, accurate, available, and
ultimately executed or put into action”).
12. Id. at 16–18 (“It is within their structures and governance procedures that orga-
nizations are able to address the issues of responsibility, accountability, and coor-
dination toward the achievement of their purpose and goals.”).
13. VASUDHA CHHOTRAY & GERRY STOKER, GOVERNANCE THEORY AND PRACTICE: A
CROSS-DISCIPLINARY APPROACH 3–4 (2009) (explaining why the need for govern-
ance typically arises when “a plurality of actors or organizations” interact with-
out a “formal control system”).
14. See DIETER DE SMET & NICOLAS MAYER, INTEGRATION OF IT GOVERNANCE AND
SECURITY RISK MANAGEMENT: A SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE REVIEW 3–4 (2016),
http://nmayer.eu/publis/DeSmet-Mayer_I-Society_1.0.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
BS3V-AGJM] (describing how governance defines the “location, distribution and
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needs”—a term of art that refers to agency objectives or functions de-
termined by law, policy, or discretion.15
One can further define cybersecurity governance as the decision
processes that determine how an organization designs an information-
security program, oversees its implementation, and continuously
adapts it to changing business needs and threats.16 Consequentially,
both the public and private sectors have embraced it as an indispensa-
ble component of a resilient cybersecurity posture.17
III. STATE CYBERSECURITY GOVERNANCE EXTENDS
BEYOND THE NETWORK
The general discourse on cybersecurity governance is limited to its
role in defending an organization’s internal or proprietary information
assets.18 This narrow view is logical when examining information se-
curity in the private sector, where managers focus first and foremost
on reducing risk to their bottom line. State officials also spend consid-
erable time and energy defending state networks, but unlike private
organizations, government leaders have an inherent responsibility to
assist nonstate entities. This obligation expands the scope of cyber-
security governance for states.
The preeminent duty of every state is to safeguard the public wel-
fare. Since its inception, the U.S. Constitution has embodied this prin-
pattern of managerial responsibilities and control that ultimately affect how IT
resources are applied and then implemented”).
15. James S. Denford, Gregory S. Dawson & Kevin C. Desouza, An Argument for
Centralization of IT Governance in the Public Sector, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
48TH ANNUAL HAWAII INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SYSTEM SCIENCES 4493,
4494 (2015), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/645f/6df7254278f8d514e1c4bbcbd6
557211a9e4.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/3HBW-RQF2].
16. DOUGLAS GRAY ET AL., CARNEGIE MELLON UNIV., IMPROVING FEDERAL CYBER-
SECURITY GOVERNANCE THROUGH DATA-DRIVEN DECISION MAKING AND EXECUTION
9 (2015), https://resources.sei.cmu.edu/asset_files/TechnicalReport/2015_005_001
_444963.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/EP26-GYWU]; see also DEB BODEAU ET AL.,
MITRE, CYBER SECURITY GOVERNANCE 11–12 (2010), https://www.mitre.org/sites/
default/files/pdf/10_3710.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/7ZEH-GT89] (discussing as-
pects of enterprise risk management such as “aligning cyber security risk
management”).
17. GRAY ET AL., supra note 16, at 9 (“Governance and risk management are inextri-
cably linked—governance is an expression of responsible risk management and
effective risk management requires efficient governance.”).
18. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, PWC’S BOARD CYBERSECURITY GOVERN-
ANCE FRAMEWORK (2016), https://www.pwc.com/ca/en/consulting/publications/
20160310-pwc-reinforcing-your-organizations-cybersecurity-governance.pdf
[https://perma.unl.edu/PSE3-GRF9]; Prakash Binwal, Creating a Cybersecurity
Governance Framework: The Necessity of Time, SECURITYINTELLIGENCE (June 29,
2015), https://securityintelligence.com/creating-a-cybersecurity-governance-
framework-the-necessity-of-time [https://perma.unl.edu/G9UR-WZHR].
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ciple, as have most state constitutions.19 The art and science of public
policy involves prioritizing the most dangerous threats to the public
welfare, resourcing countermeasures, and implementing them.
Thousands of state officials in emergency management, law enforce-
ment, and homeland security dedicate themselves to this mission, pre-
paring for floods, epidemics, and terrorism—all while working daily to
deter ordinary crime. The principles and frameworks for guiding gov-
ernment action in these areas are well-known and tested on a regular
basis.
Cyber attacks are a relatively new threat to the public welfare that
demands equal attention from state leaders. Criminals and foreign ad-
versaries exploit security vulnerabilities in software and hardware to
impose untold financial costs on individuals and businesses and dis-
rupt important services. Both federal and state authorities have a cor-
responding obligation to protect citizens’ data, guarantee public
services, and provide helpful resources to nongovernmental entities.
First, state and local bodies possess an enormous trove of sensitive
data that is vulnerable to compromise.20 For instance, the intellectual
property housed in systems owned and controlled by public universi-
ties is a potential goldmine for U.S. adversaries seeking a competitive
edge.21 Critics who assail private retailers for failing to protect cus-
tomer information can argue that inadequate security within state
agencies constitutes an even greater breach of trust. This impacts the
19. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form
a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for
the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of
Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution
for the United States of America.”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“That government is, or
ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and security of the
people, nation, or community; of all the various modes and forms of government,
that is best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and
safety . . . .”).
20. See 850,000 People Potentially Impacted by WorkSource Oregon Security Breach,
FOX 12 OR. (Oct. 13, 2014), http://www.kptv.com/story/26776035/worksource-ore-
gon-data-breach-affects-850000-people; Data Breach: Where Did South Carolina
Go Wrong?, GOV’T TECH. (Nov. 26, 2012), http://www.govtech.com/e-government/
Data-Breach-Where-Did-South-Carolina-Go-Wrong.html [https://perma.unl.edu/
S6SW-P3HZ]; The Data Breach Solution Center, UTAH DEP’T HEALTH, http://www
.health.utah.gov/databreach [https://perma.unl.edu/S6YP-54XG].
21. As one leading threat analyst explains: “Universities have a very rich intellectual
property base, emerging technology, new patents and cutting-edge research in an
environment meant to be open to the world and collaboration . . . .” Hannah
Kuchler, Universities Top the List for Hackers, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2014), https://
www.ft.com/content/23a25e1e-9e3a-11e3-b429-00144feab7de; see also Shane
Harris & Alexa Corse, Chinese Hackers Target U.S. University with Government
Ties, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 21, 2015), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/
08/21/chinese-hackers-target-u-s-university-with-government-ties.html [https://
perma.unl.edu/M3WY-VUZP] (describing attempts by an APT actor to access sen-
sitive research data at the University of Virginia, Charlottesville).
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success of e-government and the allure of “smart cities” or “smart
states,” both of which assume that citizens will provide data to public
officials—an assumption that could prove incorrect if news of security
breaches casts doubt on the ability of government to safeguard private
information. Examining the success or failure of state-run informa-
tion-security programs is therefore critical to understanding technol-
ogy policy at large.
Second, in practical terms, state and local authorities form the
frontlines for incident and disruption response. Traditional risks to
the public welfare—violent crime, disease, and natural disasters—
manifest themselves locally. Regardless of the scale of a given crime or
disaster, state and local authorities are first on the scene. This is no
different in the context of cyberspace. Although cyber attacks occur in
the digital realm, their effects are ultimately tied to the physical
world, and they require a physical response. In the case of cyber
crime, state and local law enforcement agencies normally take the
lead; federal agencies limit their own involvement to major cases. In
the event of a high-consequence, widespread attack on critical infra-
structure, when federal agencies mobilize en masse, state and local
involvement will remain indispensable to response and recovery activ-
ities. As the commander in chief of a state’s National Guard, each gov-
ernor is responsible for integrating the National Guard into
emergency planning for such an event.
Third, states shape information-security practices in the private
sector. At least thirteen states have passed laws requiring in-state en-
tities that own or manage personal information to implement “reason-
able” cybersecurity measures.22 Although federal agencies issue
cybersecurity standards for major components of the nation’s power
grid, state regulators oversee how electricity is distributed at the local
level. That gives state public utility commissions direct authority over
cybersecurity standards for the electric grid.23 States are also closely
involved in water-utility operations, a sector that remains highly vul-
nerable to disruption.24 Furthermore, state oversight of the insurance
22. Data Security Laws: State Government, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Jan. 16,
2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-tech-
nology/data-security-laws-state-government.aspx [https://perma.unl.edu/8RY4-
5P6X].
23. See, e.g., ARTHUR H. HOUSE & STEPHEN M. CAPOZZI, CONN. PUB. UTILS. REGULA-
TORY AUTH., CONNECTICUT PUBLIC UTILITIES CYBERSECURITY ACTION PLAN (2016),
http://www.ct.gov/pura/lib/pura/electric/cyber_report_april_6_2016.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/JXN9-6LSK].
24. See, e.g., VERIZON, DATA BREACH DIGEST 39–40 (2016), http://www.verizonenter-
prise.com/resources/reports/rp_data-breach-digest_xg_en.pdf [https://perma.unl
.edu/YD9T-RHXP]; Tod Newcombe, As Water Utilities Move Online, Hackers Take
Note, GOVERNING (Feb. 2016), http://www.governing.com/columns/tech-talk/gov-
water-utilities-cybersecurity-hackers.html [https://perma.unl.edu/FH8D-TVJW].
A 2002 law requires water utilities serving more than 3300 people to conduct
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industry bestows on state insurance commissioners the power to
shape the growing cybersecurity-insurance marketplace.25
Fourth, improving how state and local governments enhance their
own data security is a national security imperative. As previously de-
scribed, states have an indispensable role in safeguarding the critical
infrastructure that provides essential services to communities across
the nation. While security breaches inside state governments are fre-
quently portrayed as a problem for the victim state alone, threat ac-
tors can leverage seemingly minor successes to carry out larger
attacks.
Finally, states are in many respects responsible for cybersecurity
education and workforce-development initiatives.26 State education-
oversight bodies manage education standards,27 and governors pos-
sess unique authority to convene companies and schools to align cur-
riculums with business needs.28 Likewise, governors are
spearheading initiatives to steer veterans toward cybersecurity certifi-
cates and degrees.29
While experts regularly analyze federal efforts to secure the fed-
eral bureaucracy30 and assist the private sector in defending itself,31
academic and policy analysts have neglected examinations of state-
vulnerability assessments and create emergency response plans that account for
cyber threats. 42 U.S.C. § 300i-2 (2012).
25. See Key Issue: The National System of State Regulation and Cybersecurity, NAT’L
ASSOC. INS. COMMISSIONERS, http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_cyber_risk
.htm [https://perma.unl.edu/ZSN9-Z5SX].
26. States confront four interrelated challenges to building, recruiting, and retaining
a cybersecurity workforce. First, many companies are unable to find or hire em-
ployees who possess the skills necessary for writing computer code, analyzing
network traffic, using security applications, or managing cybersecurity projects.
Second, while graduates with these skills often find employment, supply remains
limited because schools struggle to attract new students to the field or find the
resources to educate those who do show interest. Third, there is a gap in finding
qualified teachers to educate students in this field. Finally, cybersecurity special-
ists frequently choose lucrative positions in the private sector, leaving resource-
strapped government agencies struggling to fill even the most basic positions.
These four problems combine to create a cybersecurity workforce shortage that
holds back state economic development and imperils government networks.
27. See State Boards of Education, NAT’L ASS’N ST. BOARDS EDUC., http://www.nasbe
.org/about-us/state-boards-of-education [https://perma.unl.edu/5A6E-GEF6].
28. See, e.g., Press Release, R.I. Gov’t, Raimondo Kicks-off State’s First K–12 Com-
puter Science Initiative (Mar. 7, 2016), http://www.ri.gov/press/view/27020
[https://perma.unl.edu/EA5K-D2DQ].
29. See, e.g., Press Release, Governor Terry McAuliffe, Governor McAuliffe An-
nounces Cybersecurity Training Initiative for Veterans in Virginia (Nov. 11,
2016), https://governor.virginia.gov/newsroom/newsarticle?articleID=18301
[https://perma.unl.edu/BR9J-DYTS].
30. See., e.g., GREGORY C. WILSHUSEN, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INFORMA-
TION SECURITY: CYBER THREATS AND DATA BREACHES ILLUSTRATE NEED FOR
STRONGER CONTROLS ACROSS FEDERAL AGENCIES (2015), http://www.gao.gov/as-
sets/680/671253.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/HVW2-9PCA].
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level policy. The first step to a deeper understanding for any re-
searcher is to recognize how states implement cybersecurity policy as
it applies to state agencies and beyond. In the previous Part, we de-
fined cybersecurity governance as the decision processes for designing
an information-security program, overseeing its implementation, and
continuously adapting it to changing business needs and threats.32
State cybersecurity governance comprises the laws, regulations, poli-
cies, procedures, organizational structures, and personal relationships
that control how states: (1) secure public information assets, (2) re-
spond to the effects of cyber attacks on public or private infrastruc-
ture, and (3) assist private citizens and businesses in securing their
own information assets. Past and current state cybersecurity initia-
tives reflect the growing recognition among state officials that govern-
ance structures are critical to achieving these objectives.33
IV. CENTRALIZING SECURITY GOVERNANCE TO
DEFEND STATE NETWORKS
Our broader concept of state cybersecurity governance does not ex-
clude the traditional mission of cybersecurity: protecting the informa-
tion that states own and control through IT security management.34
Most overarching state IT structures (as distinguished from informa-
tion-security programs) fall into one of three categories. A centralized-
IT governance model is one where the CIO has authority for decisions
related to IT strategy, project prioritization, and infrastructure man-
agement for most or all of the state’s executive branch.35 A decentral-
ized model devolves this authority to individual state business units.
In a federalized model, state CIOs and CISOs share IT managerial
responsibilities with other state business units.
The characteristics and tradeoffs of these models have a direct
bearing on the success of information-security programs. Experts as-
sert that a centralized-security governance model promotes a resilient
posture.36 This is true for technical and administrative reasons. In a
31. See, e.g., Gus P. Coldebella & Brian M. White, Foundational Questions Regarding
the Federal Role in Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 233 (2010).
32. GRAY ET AL., supra note 16, at 10; see also BODEAU ET AL., supra note 16, at 11–12
(discussing aspects of enterprise risk management such as “aligning cyber secur-
ity risk management”).
33. While we believe that governance processes are essential in managing cyber-
security workforce initiatives as well, this topic is too complex to address in a
single paper of this length.
34. DE SMET & MAYER, supra note 14, at 4.
35. Denford et al., supra note 15, at 4494.
36. SCOTT RASMUSSEN, CENTRALIZED NETWORK SECURITY MANAGEMENT: COMBINING
DEFENSE IN DEPTH WITH MANAGEABLE SECURITY 1 (2002), https://www.sans.org/
reading-room/whitepapers/bestprac/centralized-network-security-management-
combining-defense-in-depth-manageable-security-659 [https://perma.unl.edu/
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centralized-IT environment, CISOs and their staff can use a smaller
number of security-management tools, reducing workload and in-
creasing proficiency. Consolidating security management allows mul-
tiple organizations to purchase software and hardware at scale,
reducing costs.37 A centralized security system also encourages stan-
dardized reporting of security incidents, which facilitates a coordi-
nated response.38 Perhaps most important, a survey of state CISOs
indicates that centralization provides them with more authority to im-
plement best practices and assign accountability for security
breaches.39
States pursue centralization in different ways. Some focus on legal
authority. As far back as 2006, Colorado moved to strengthen the
CIO’s power to issue cybersecurity standards with the Colorado Infor-
mation Security Act. This granted the CIO, through the CISO, express
authority to review and approve agency security plans and budget re-
quests.40 Colorado agencies must also adhere to the CISO’s stan-
dards.41 In the event of noncompliance, and after notification of the
governor, the CISO can “temporarily discontinue or suspend the oper-
ation of [the agency’s] communication and information resources.”42
Other states leverage the power of the governor’s office to promote
centralization. In Oregon, Governor Kate Brown recently issued an
executive order entitled “Unifying Cyber Security in Oregon,” which
transferred the state agencies’ IT-security functions and employees to
the CIO’s office,43 thereby emphasizing centralization’s impact on se-
curity. In April 2017, Alaska Governor Bill Walker also signed an or-
der consolidating IT management and authorizing the CIO to enforce
information-security policy and practices within all executive-branch
agencies.44
WDW7-STVX] (“With a few careful considerations for data redundancy and ar-
chival, centralized network security management can take advantage of the full
power and potential for defense in depth and a hardened security posture.”);
Warkentin & Johnston, supra note 11, at 16–20.
37. See, e.g., J.D. Sartain, Why Governments Centralize IT Security, STATETECH
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.statetechmagazine.com/article/2014/09/why-govern-
ments-centralize-it-security [https://perma.unl.edu/U4ZK-JZE8].
38. See KURT GARBARS, IMPLEMENTING AN EFFECTIVE IT SECURITY PROGRAM 11
(2002), https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/bestprac/implementing-
effective-security-program-80 [https://perma.unl.edu/3ENE-8CJ6].
39. CISOs who operate within a federalized model report difficulty exercising influ-
ence and authority across the state enterprise. See DELOITTE–NASCIO STUDY,
supra note 7.
40. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-37.5-403 (2016).
41. COLO. REV. STAT.  § 24-37.5-404 (2016).
42. § 24-37.5-404(4).
43. Or. Exec. Order No. 16-13 (Sept. 12, 2016), https://www.oregon.gov/gov/Docu-
ments/executive_orders/eo_16-13.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/VGW3-BPEE].
44. Press Release, Governor Bill Walker, State of Alaska, Governor Walker An-
nounces Overhaul of State IT Services (Apr. 25, 2017), https://gov.alaska.gov/
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Other states have sought to centralize through data management.
Ohio has contracted with a major computing company to build a data
center for all but four of the state’s twenty-six cabinet-level agencies.
This single cloud-based environment allows the state CIO and CISO
to deploy “centrally managed end-point protection and vulnerability
management tools.”45 Moreover, officials have reported cost savings,
improved service delivery, and “a diminished risk profile from a secur-
ity and access perspective.”46 In Oklahoma, the Information Technol-
ogy Operations Command Center provides a unified “nerve center” for
threat monitoring and response for fifty-eight state agencies.47 In Feb-
ruary 2017, a top state official testified that the Command Center had
successfully blocked a ransomware attack on all unified state agen-
cies; the only entity infected with the ransomware was one that had
yet to unify.48 Accordingly, Oklahoma Governor Mary Fallin stated,
“The importance of state agencies unifying their IT with [the state’s IT
agency] to have the best cybersecurity available cannot be
understated.”49
Despite its positive impact on security, centralization can provoke
a bureaucratic backlash among agencies that perceive security re-
quirements as an unnecessary burden on their respective business
functions.50 A state agency in a centralized model is not necessarily
free to select its preferred IT solutions if a supervisory CISO disap-
proves. Resolving differences and implementing policies will be diffi-
cult without knowing an agency’s needs and policy positions. Without
a comprehensive “network structuring phase,” during which agency
stakeholders’ needs and concerns are addressed, a new, centralized
newsroom/2017/04/governor-walker-announces-overhaul-of-state-it-services
[https://perma.unl.edu/DP56-7EXY].
45. OHIO DEP’T OF ADMIN. SERVS., IT OPTIMIZATION: STATUS UPDATE 2014, at 7 (2014),
http://das.ohio.gov/Portals/0/DASDivisions/InformationTechnology/IS/pdf/IT%20
Optimization%20Status%20Update%20-%202014.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
7JW4-9VH3].
46. Id. at 17.
47. OFFICE OF MGMT. & ENTER. SERVS., PROGRESS ON UNIFICATION (2015), https://
www.ok.gov/cio/documents/HB1304QuarterlyReport06302015.pdf [https://perma
.unl.edu/4MQ7-KVUT].
48. Grant Hermes, Gov, OMES Confirm Agency Hacked, No Ransom Paid, NEWS 9
(Feb. 17, 2017), http://www.news9.com/story/34515915/governor-refutes-claim-
state-agency-paid-ransom-after-att.
49. Press Release, Governor Mary Fallin, State of Okla., Gov. Fallin, OMES on
Cybersecurity Incident: Unification Essential to Prevent Cybersecurity Attacks
(Feb. 14, 2017), http://services.ok.gov/triton/modules/newsroom/newsroom_article
.php?id=223&article_id=29400 [https://perma.unl.edu/MKJ4-SZQ4].
50. MANSUR HASIB, CYBERSECURITY LEADERSHIP: POWERING THE MODERN ORGANIZA-
TION 77 (2014) (“[C]ustomer satisfaction increases as decentralization increases—
up to a certain point.”); Richard Pastore, Models for Global IT Governance, CIO
(Mar. 3, 2008), http://www.cio.com/article/2437034/it-organization/models-for-
global-it-governance.html [https://perma.unl.edu/HFJ6-GJ8P].
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model can fail due to a lack of engagement with stakeholders.51 States
must therefore examine and account for existing relationships be-
tween state agencies and their adherence to security policies. This
process identifies all relevant personnel across the state enterprise,
initiates partnerships, and lays the groundwork for successful collabo-
ration on policy implementation and incident/disruption response.
This “accountability framework” enforces norms and fosters trust.52
This also ensures that agencies report security concerns to the state
CIO and CISO and not assume they will be unduly punished.
To provide a picture of IT centralization across the states, we ex-
amined enabling statutes and executive orders establishing state IT
agencies. This analysis does not measure the centralization of infor-
mation security but offers insight into how states can leverage their IT
centralization to improve information-security outcomes. Moreover, as
mentioned previously, IT-security centralization is a launching point
to expand cybersecurity governance beyond networks.
To identify a state’s “degree of centralization,” we used a series of
indicators that are proven to increase state IT effectiveness within
centralized, state IT agencies: (1) ability to craft a statewide IT strat-
egy;53 (2) authority over statewide IT budget or authorization for IT
projects across the state enterprise, or both; (3) managerial control
over IT personnel across the executive branch; (4) ability to implement
statewide IT policies and standards; and (5) coordination of all IT ac-
tivities. In addition to these five indicators, we add a sixth: legislative
approval. This derives from a study finding that legislative approval of
a CIO increases efficiency and impact of IT investments.54 Although
this indicator does not directly influence centralized-IT governance,
we believe it is a relevant indicator of efficiency and effectiveness.55
51. Network structuring is the process of changing relationships between actors,
shifting resources, and calling for a new policy direction. See CHHOTRAY &
STOKER, supra note 13, at 48.
52. Min-Seok Pang, IT Governance and Business Value in the Public Sector Organi-
zations—The Role of Elected Representatives in IT Governance and Its Impact on
IT Value in U.S. State Governments, 59 DECISION SUPPORT SYSS. 275 (2014).
53. First, when embarking on any ambitious public policy project, state governments
must base their goals on individual circumstances and needs. This is true for any
traditional economic, public health, or public safety initiative. This principle is
equally critical in cybersecurity for reasons that are both practical and legal, and
effective cybersecurity governance depends on a solid strategic foundation that
recognizes a state’s unique attributes. Not surprisingly, states are increasingly
prioritizing the creation of comprehensive cybersecurity strategies that describe
an end state for state cybersecurity, scope government initiatives, identify roles
for private partners, and select metrics for measuring progress. Therefore, state-
wide cybersecurity strategies were identified to determine if there were gaps be-
tween states that have authority to create a statewide IT strategy and those that
created a statewide cybersecurity strategy.
54. Pang, supra note 52, at 274.
55. See infra Appendix for an explanation of methodology.
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We did not conduct a formal statistical analysis for three reasons.
First, there is still debate about how to define cybersecurity effective-
ness, and states may differ in how they characterize effectiveness.
Secondly, states differ in how they characterize “cyber attacks,”
“breaches,” and “intrusions.”56 Lastly, not all states publish how many
cyber attacks they block, how many attacks successfully intrude into
state networks, and how many attacks successfully launch their
payload. As a result, we cannot conclude that a state with all six traits
can successfully utilize their centralization to prevent cybersecurity
incidents. Rather, this data highlights how state policymakers can in-
tegrate cybersecurity protocols through their current state-IT-central-
ization authorities.
Figure 1 below illustrates the findings, and Table 1 details how
many states exhibited each indicator. As Figure 1 shows, as of April
2017, roughly half of the states exhibited at least four indicators.57
Table 1: Allocation of States by Indicator
States with Full States with Half
Indicator Point Point
Policy 38 3
Coordination 37 1
Strategy 34 6
Budget 32 11
Legislative
Engagement 13 1
Personnel 8 2
56. PAUL CICHONSKI ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., COMPUTER SECURITY
INCIDENT HANDLING GUIDE 40 n.46 (2012), http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/
SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-61r2.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/LP8Q-G4CY].
57. See infra Appendix for state-specific indicators.
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To the extent that states want to utilize their IT agencies’ centrali-
zation to improve information security, we recommend the following.
First, states wishing to further centralize their IT authorities and net-
works within the CIO’s office should establish a governance structure
that brings together all agency directors and private-sector partners.
Fortunately, governors recognize this need, and several have created
various cybersecurity task forces, commissions, and councils to allow
these parties to collaborate on IT centralization and other issues.
These bodies, usually established through executive order, are prima-
rily tasked with identifying policies to mitigate cyber threats to the
state.58 Representing a whole-of-government approach, these bodies
include representatives from IT, higher education, homeland security,
emergency management, National Guard, departments of revenue,
and others.59 Through these bodies, the stakeholders not only discuss
how to improve IT network security but address issues such as
reinventing the workforce pipeline challenge; assisting hospitals to
prepare, respond, and recover from cyber events; enhancing fusion
centers’ cybersecurity capabilities; and leveraging business and eco-
nomic opportunities.60 This is therefore a crucial mechanism for
states to initiate centralization and to build trust to begin identifying
priorities that extend beyond defending state networks.
These bodies can then be leveraged to implement our second rec-
ommendation: creating a cybersecurity strategy. State IT agencies
with the authority to create a single statewide IT strategy applicable
to all executive agencies should integrate cybersecurity goals and
objectives. As Table 1 illustrates, in April 2017 at least thirty-four
state IT agencies had the authority to implement statewide IT strate-
gies, but only twelve of those states had cybersecurity goals and objec-
tives in their strategies.61 Some states have multiple agencies
possessing cybersecurity elements in their respective strategies.62
This could lead to duplication of efforts and divergent spending priori-
ties, decreasing efficiency. Creating a single, unified cybersecurity
strategy—whether stand-alone or within a single, overarching IT
strategy—that details a statewide effort to achieve cybersecurity goals
can drive the entire state enterprise toward the same priorities.
Finally, to facilitate the implementation of a cybersecurity strat-
egy, IT agencies may consider utilizing their authority to reject
58. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, MEMO ON STATE CYBERSECURITY GOVERNANCE BODIES
(2016) [hereinafter GOVERNANCE BODIES], https://ci.nga.org/files/live/sites/ci/files/
1617/docs/TaskForceMemoFinal.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/RM3Q-HW57].
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, MEMO ON STATE CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES (2017),
https://ci.nga.org/files/live/sites/ci/files/1617/docs/1703CybersecurityStrategies
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/QWH7-SXQW].
62. Id.
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projects or budgets if they do not align with stated goals and objec-
tives. By conducting risk-based analyses on all executive agencies dur-
ing the formation of a strategy, priorities will be aligned based on the
most vulnerable areas with the highest level of consequences if they
were to be disrupted. IT agencies could then require agencies’ budgets
to reflect these priorities based on their individual risk assessments.
This recommendation further underscores the importance of bringing
agency principals together because there would undoubtedly be hostil-
ity if this policy were to be implemented unilaterally. In other words,
building trust between stakeholders is paramount to state cyber-
security and is the foundation to state cybersecurity governance.
V. GOVERNANCE BEYOND NETWORK DEFENSE
As the three recommendations above illustrate, implementing
state cybersecurity policies should involve emergency management,
law enforcement, academia, the health sector, critical infrastructure,
private-sector partners, and others. Convening these stakeholders to
address the first fundamental challenge of cybersecurity—securing
the state’s networks—builds relationships and fosters trust that can
be employed to undertake larger issues: preparing and responding to
cyber disruption events, addressing cyber crime, launching cyber-
security centers, and enhancing the cybersecurity-workforce pipeline.
A. Disruption Response
Regardless of its size, population, economy, or assets, every state is
vulnerable to a cyber event that exposes private data or limits access
to public services. Unlike private companies, whose disruption re-
sponse plans are generally limited to remediating and recovering their
own business processes, states must be prepared to respond holisti-
cally to a high-consequence cyber disruption. Potential risks to water
systems, electric grids, 9-1-1 dispatch centers, and hospitals have led
states to apportion roles and responsibilities among homeland secur-
ity, public safety, and emergency-management agencies.63 As with
any natural disaster, responding to a cyber disruption requires close
coordination among these stakeholders and direction by their respec-
tive leadership teams.64
63. NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N, MEMO ON STATE CYBERSECURITY RESPONSE PLANS (2016)
[hereinafter RESPONSE PLANS], https://ci.nga.org/files/live/sites/ci/files/1617/docs/
MemoOnStateCybersecurityResponsePlans.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/6C92-
2UCK].
64. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE CHIEF INFO. OFFICERS, CYBER DISRUPTION RESPONSE PLAN-
NING GUIDE 2 (2016) [hereinafter NASCIO GUIDE], http://www.nascio.org/Portals/
0/Publications/Documents/2016/NASCIO_CyberDisruption_072016.pdf [https://
perma.unl.edu/BM99-CQQ9].
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Although it is a subcomponent of state cybersecurity governance,
disruption response demands a governance structure all its own. The
National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP) refers to governance
as a “vital and an enabling factor in states’ cyber asset response
role.”65 The National Association of State Chief Information Officers
(NASCIO) reiterated this point and emphasized the need to establish
governance among a wide range of agencies, to detail roles and re-
sponsibilities during cyber disruptions, and to involve external part-
ners.66 NASCIO contends that a response plan should “apply to all
State agencies, boards, commissions, and departments . . . as well as
local governments,” further emphasizing the need for a whole-of-state
approach to cyber-disruption response.67
In previous research, we identified thirteen disruption response
plans in states.68 These plans are typically written as an annex to a
statewide emergency operations plan (EOP), embodying the whole-of-
state approach by directing fusion centers, state police, departments
of military affairs, the National Guard, departments of public safety,
and others to prepare and respond to a cyber event.69 The plans there-
fore recognize a cyber event’s potential to transition from a virtual
matter to a physical one. As a result, they ensure all appropriate state
agencies are ready to respond.
The NCIRP recommends that states synchronize their cyber-dis-
ruption response plans with their EOPs.70 Executing a response plan
as an annex to an EOP has at least two benefits. First, it facilitates
integration with existing emergency support functions (ESFs)—such
as communications, emergency management, and resource and logis-
tics support—without duplicating or contradicting established proce-
dures. State officials who are already familiar with ESF functions can
more easily understand their own roles during a cyber response if
plans interlock with existing processes and known lines of
communication.
A second benefit is that a state emergency-operations center
(SEOC) or a unified command system (UCS)—emergency decision-
making bodies included in most EOPs—provides a ready-made gov-
ernance framework that can be modified to reflect the priorities of a
cyber response. For example, in Virginia, three agencies lead the UCS
during a cyber event. The IT agency manages cyber-response activi-
ties, while the emergency-management agency and state police coordi-
65. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL CYBER INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN 16
(2016) [hereinafter NCIRP], https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/ncirp/Na-
tional_Cyber_Incident_Response_Plan.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/8UUW-F3F2].
66. NASCIO GUIDE, supra note 64, at 20–21.
67. Id. at 21.
68. GOVERNANCE BODIES, supra note 58.
69. Id.
70. NCIRP, supra note 65, at 16.
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nate response and recovery efforts.71 Organizing a response through
the SEOC also reinforces the necessity of a whole-of-state effort, re-
ducing the potential for bureaucratic friction.
Governance structures surrounding response efforts should always
emphasize cooperation with nonstate entities prior to a crisis. Private
industry owns and operates over eighty-five percent of the nation’s
critical infrastructure.72 Partnerships with these owners pave the way
for threat-information sharing, implementation of mitigation policies,
and identification of the necessary resources and coordination efforts
needed to respond and recover from a cyber disruption event.73 Gov-
ernance bodies provide an avenue for state information-security and
emergency-management officials to identify private-sector resources
and establish communication pathways before a significant cyber
event. Critically, they also provide an organizational framework for
developing and exercising response plans to identify mistaken as-
sumptions and potential revisions.
B. Law Enforcement
Although frequently overlooked in cybersecurity-policy discus-
sions, state and local law enforcement professionals are in fact the tip
of the spear. Not only do they play a critical role in cyber-disruption
response, but they also must fulfill their primary duty: investigating
and prosecuting cyber criminals. How states plan for and fund this
mission, by which a state fulfills its obligation to protect the public
welfare, is an indispensable aspect of state cybersecurity governance.
Financial losses from computer crime and identity theft can have a
devastating impact on individuals, particularly those living on a fixed
income, as well as small businesses.74
Unfortunately, many state and local investigators lack the laws,
resources, and knowledge to investigate these crimes, identify sus-
pects, and deter other potential criminals. The FBI and Secret Service
71. RESPONSE PLANS, supra note 63, at 1.
72. Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, INFO. SHARING ENV’T, https://www.ise
.gov/mission-partners/critical-infrastructure-and-key-resources [https://perma
.unl.edu/7D7G-6FWW].
73. NASCIO GUIDE, supra note 64, at 22.
74. One survey by the National Cyber Security Alliance estimated that sixty percent
of small businesses close within six months of a cyber attack. Gary Miller, 60% of
Small Companies that Suffer a Cyber Attack Are Out of Business Within Six
Months, DENVER POST (Mar. 24, 2017), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/10/23/
small-companies-cyber-attack-out-of-business [https://perma.unl.edu/RW83-
N6D5]. Aggregated data provides a more tangible picture. In 2015, the FBI re-
ceived 127,145 separate complaints of Internet crimes totaling over one billion
dollars in losses. Note that many of these instances involve nonpayment of online
transactions or harassment. INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF JUS-
TICE, 2015 INTERNET CRIME REPORT 12 (2015), https://pdf.ic3.gov/2015_IC3Report
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/ZP3D-GCRP].
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lend their expertise only in the most serious cases; federal investiga-
tors rarely focus on ordinary computer crime, notwithstanding its
massive impact.75 Consequently, computer criminals with a low pro-
file can operate with relative impunity. Closing this capability gap de-
mands a governance structure.
First and foremost, policymakers must determine whether their
criminal code satisfies law enforcement needs in this area. Some laws
do not authorize investigators to pursue all computer crimes. Every
state legislature has criminalized computer hacking and computer
fraud, but the scope of prohibited activities varies widely. Broad stat-
utes allow prosecutors to target a wide range of criminal acts and so
do not necessarily merit regular updates to keep pace with technologi-
cal change. Massachusetts law carries a criminal penalty for any per-
son who “without authorization, knowingly accesses a computer
system by any means, or . . . knows that such access is not authorized
and fails to terminate such access.”76 This formulation provides great
flexibility to investigate and prosecute creative cyber criminals. States
with narrower prohibitions have amended their computer-crime stat-
utes to reflect evolving criminal tactics. In 2017, New York created a
new criminal prohibition focused on denial-of-service attacks.77 Cali-
fornia recently amended its laws targeting extortion by explicitly and
clearly prohibiting the use of ransomware.78 In recent years, many
states have increased the penalty for hacking offenses. Formalizing a
continuous dialogue between criminal investigators, policymakers,
state technology officials, and lawmakers to keep pace with computer
criminals is an important part of state cybersecurity governance.
Properly configured laws alone do not provide the practical capabil-
ity to enforce them. Many state and local agencies either lack the ex-
pertise to conduct computer investigations, or they possess the proper
skills but suffer from a severe personnel shortage. As the Police Exec-
utive Research Forum observed in 2014, “[M]ost of the 18,000 local
and state law enforcement agencies have not yet developed plans and
jurisdictional authority to enter this arena.”79 Several interrelated
challenges frustrate efforts to create investigative units or develop ex-
isting ones. Building the skills and manpower necessary to track cyber
criminals and prosecute them is resource intensive; most, if not all,
state agencies operate in an austere budget environment. Com-
75. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, THE ROLE OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGEN-
CIES IN PREVENTING AND INVESTIGATING CYBERCRIME 2 (2014), http://www.police
forum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Series_2/the%20role%20of%20local%20law
%20enforcement%20agencies%20in%20preventing%20and%20investigating%20
cybercrime%202014.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/B9Y3-XZ5R].
76. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 266, § 120F (2012).
77. S.B. 114, 239th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
78. CAL. PENAL CODE § 523 (West 2017).
79. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 75, at 2.
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pounding this problem is a frequent absence of political pressure for a
robust cyber-crime capability. Cyber crime does not generate the wide-
spread outrage that can persuade public safety officials to redirect re-
sources. For various reasons, most instances of cyber crime are never
reported to police.80
These challenges will be difficult to address without elevating
cybersecurity into existing governance processes within law enforce-
ment agencies, large or small. Coordinated outreach to local individu-
als and businesses, as well as larger corporations that operate across a
region, will generate leads and improve situational awareness. In
Madison, Wisconsin, police are launching “a multi-disciplinary, com-
munity-based approach,” by creating an informational DVD, forming a
cyber-safety curriculum for classrooms, establishing a Youth Cyber
Detective Camp that delves into security in the context of cutting-edge
apps, and organizing the Madison Area Council on Cyber Safety for
Children.81
Proper engagement will generate many leads, and given the sheer
volume of cyber crimes, agencies with limited investigatory resources
must identify procedures for prioritizing cases. In Utah, the state
Cyber Crimes Unit has declined to set a specific monetary threshold
for prioritizing cyber crime cases, reasoning that it is too difficult to
measure the value of stolen information, which may not be sold or ex-
ploited for many months. Additionally, a department with only two or
three computer-forensics experts will need to balance time devoted to
computer hacking investigations with time spent on computer-enabled
crimes, which are traditional crimes committed with the aid of a
computer.
Policymakers and legislatures commit more resources to investiga-
tions that tend to produce “success”—often measured in terms of re-
covered property, indictments, or prosecutions. Some cyber-crime
investigations may be unable to pursue suspects that live overseas yet
could be able to recover lost data belonging to the victim. Law enforce-
ment professionals will need to carefully consider how to communicate
the success of cyber-crime investigations through alternative metrics.
80. Organizations may be reluctant to disclose a breach that could drive away busi-
ness. Credit-card holders who fall victim to computer fraud normally can count
on their respective banks to bear the subsequent costs and have little incentive to
seek assistance from the police. See David Braue, Most Cybersecurity Breaches Go
Unreported, Uninsured Despite Executive Concern: Barclays, CSO (Mar. 4, 2016),
http://www.cso.com.au/article/595298/most-cybersecurity-breaches-go-unreport
ed-uninsured-despite-executive-concern-barclays (“Nearly three-quarters of
cyberattacks are going unreported even as a flood of data and fraudulent attacks
sees executives losing control of their sensitive corporate data, according to a new
UK survey . . . .”).
81. POLICE EXEC. RESEARCH FORUM, supra note 75, at 35–36.
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Such decisions must be coordinated and implemented through a gov-
ernance process.
State law enforcement agencies can partially address their re-
source gap by drawing from outside expertise. Private companies may
have more investigatory experience than state or local police.82 These
experts can grab some of the “low-hanging fruit” by training all of-
ficers in basic criminal techniques for hiding and destroying evidence
that, if thwarted, can dramatically reduce the burden on the limited
number of forensic experts. In some states, law enforcement is work-
ing with computer science departments at colleges and universities
that not only offer resources to police but also provide a potential pipe-
line for tech-savvy students to enter law enforcement.83 Michigan’s
Cyber Civilian Corps (MiC3) is a unique model. The MiC3 is a group of
information-security professionals from public, education, and private
sectors who volunteer to aid public and private entities in the state
when the governor declares a state of emergency due to a cyber
event.84 States may consider using a similar model when preventing
and responding to cyber crime that affects citizens and small busi-
nesses, which would further lessen the burden on state police units.
Outside partnerships such as these require consistent and high-level
engagement by leadership across law enforcement agencies—in other
words, governance.
C. Cybersecurity Centers
Apart from security operations centers, such as Oklahoma’s Com-
mand Center, many states are planning organizations with a broader
focus. The proliferation of so-called cybersecurity centers underscores
a need for information sharing and broader coordination within and
outside of state government. These centers fortify and advance the
whole-of-government approach by including a wide range of public
and private actors to overcome complex challenges.
New Jersey and California are two states that have established
cyber centers specifically to enhance information sharing across enti-
ties. The New Jersey Cybersecurity and Communications Integration
Cell (NJCCIC) was created by executive order in May 2015 to be “the
central State civilian interface for coordinating cybersecurity informa-
tion sharing, performing cybersecurity threat analysis, and promoting
shared and real-time situational awareness between and among the
82. Id. at 41.
83. Id.
84. Michigan Cyber Civilian Corps, STATE OF MICH., http://www.michigan.gov/som/
0,4669,7-192-78403_78404_78419—-,00.html [https://perma.unl.edu/JU6N-
P49G].
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public and private sectors.”85 The California Cybersecurity Integra-
tion Center (Cal-CSIC) was also created by executive order, with the
main purpose to reduce the likelihood and severity of cyber incidents
that could damage California’s economy, its critical infrastructure, or
its public and private-sector computer networks.86 To carry out this
mission, Cal-CSIC includes a wide range of representatives such as
highway patrol, the health and human services agency, state universi-
ties, and the attorney general’s office.87 In addition to responsibilities
similar to the NJCCIC, the Cal-CSIC is charged with developing a
cybersecurity strategy and cyber-incident response team, both of
which will be leveraged to assist law enforcement agencies.88
Colorado’s National Cybersecurity Center (NCC) resembles the
previous two centers as it also coordinates responses for members and
acts as a one-stop shop for organizations that need immediate assis-
tance to resolve an active attack or breach. Yet, the NCC also includes
the Cyber Research, Education, and Training Center (CRETC) and
the Cyber Institute to provide other services. The CRETC, led by the
University of Colorado, will foster technical research and develop-
ment, education programs, and general cybersecurity workforce devel-
opment, and it will serve as the state’s key focal point for partnerships
with federal and local agencies. For instance, CRETC will establish
education, training, and academic symposia for government leaders at
all levels, as well as coordinate with community colleges in the devel-
opment and transferability of appropriate curriculum and technical
certification programs.89 Lastly, the Cyber Institute provides a loca-
tion for officials from the federal government, the state, cities, and
counties to share real-time information on cyber trends, security and
cutting-edge best practices.
Most recently, Missouri’s cybersecurity task force recommended
that the state establish its own Cybersecurity Institute, which would
have a broader mandate than that in Colorado. The Cybersecurity In-
stitute would act as a clearinghouse for schools “seeking cybersecurity
designations and accreditation” and a “one stop sho[p]” for businesses
and government agencies in need of cybersecurity advice—a conduit
to channel state and federal cybersecurity research funding, select
grantees for scholarships, and offer career services.90 Missouri’s
center remains only a proposal, but it further reflects the growing
85. N.J. Exec. Order No. 178 (May 20, 2015), http://nj.gov/infobank/circular/eocc178
.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/A2SV-ZPBW].
86. Cal. Exec. Order No. B-34-15 (Aug. 31, 2015), https://www.gov.ca.gov/docs/B-34-
15.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/4D8F-URAE].
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-33.5-1904 (2017).
90. MO. OFFICE OF CYBER SEC., MO. OFFICE OF ADMIN., CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE
ACTION PLAN 8 (2016), https://cybersecurity.mo.gov/files/task_force/plans/FINAL_
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trend toward holistic centers designed to enhance cross-sector cyber-
security outside of government. However, concerns have been raised
regarding the sustainability and effectiveness of these centers, and
the utility of such centers demands close observation.
VI. CONCLUSION
As public agencies and services increasingly incorporate networked
devices, business risk deriving from cyber threats is unlikely to abate.
Absent a major shift in federal budgeting policy, federal authorities
simply cannot offer the necessary level of assistance. Protecting citi-
zens from this threat has been and will continue to be a state responsi-
bility, just as it is the state’s responsibility to protect citizens from
robberies, assaults, and natural disasters. Cybersecurity is no longer
an IT issue that relies on IT professionals implementing IT solutions.
It requires a concerted effort by the state to convene CIOs, hospital
administrators, university provosts, public utility commissioners, po-
lice chiefs, and private company CEOs (among others) to address the
vast implications of cyber risks.
This is not a simple task. The history of public policy is riddled
with examples of failures to bring a diverse group of stakeholders to-
gether to solve complex challenges. Yet, through formal governance
mechanisms, as described throughout this Article, states can better
position themselves and their constituents to adopt a mature risk pos-
ture. This will ensure that citizens are adequately protected from
cyber threats, while enjoying the benefits of an ever-expanding, digi-
tally-connected world.
Our observations and recommendations outlined above are neither
final nor unimpeachable; we have merely marked a path for future
researchers who want to assess cybersecurity policy. Cybersecurity as
a discipline cuts across virtually every public policy field, and yet it
lacks the research tools for measuring progress that are common to
other policy arenas. More researchers must examine the effectiveness
of state cybersecurity governance through a framework to assess
cybersecurity strategies, funding priorities, response plans, cyber-
crime units, cyber centers, and workforce initiatives.
Cybersecurity_Task_Force_Action_Plan_12.29.16.pdf [https://perma.unl.edu/
SJV3-LZM7].
2017] BEYOND THE NETWORK 277
APPENDIX: STATES AND INDICATORS
Our methodology allocates for each state a full point for every crite-
rion it meets fully, and a half point for partial completion. Full points
were only allotted if the IT agency had authority to implement a strat-
egy, policies, and standards over all executive branch agencies. A full
point was allocated to states whose IT agencies had complete control
over the state’s IT expenditures or approved agencies’ expenditures.
Half points were allocated if the IT agency could only recommend
budget needs for state agencies. A full point was given if the agency
had full authority over all statewide IT personnel across the executive
branch, and half a point if they could recommend the hiring of person-
nel. “Coordination” was ambiguously defined in research, so a state
was allotted a point if “coordinate” or “coordination” was in the statute
or executive order. Lastly, half a point was given for legislative en-
gagement to a state if a legislative committee was created or designed
to oversee the IT agency but did not have authority to approve the
CIO. These points were not weighted due to the sixth indicator deriv-
ing from a separate study. State officials were not consulted for this
analysis, and therefore, a state’s degree of centralization is solely
based on statutes and executive orders. Alaska and Missouri were not
included in this analysis due to lack of access to their legislative
materials. Oregon was omitted due to the re-organization of its IT gov-
ernance structure during the writing of this paper. Territories were
also not examined.
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